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INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

**CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL ROLE:  
KEY ISSUES,  
COMMON INTERESTS,  
DIFFERENT APPROACHES**

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priority, which is: economic relations. The USA's decision to uncouple the most favoured nation clause from the human rights issue was an excellent instance of this way of thinking. Substantive progress will only be possible in the long run if Western negotiating partners consistently endeavour to resolve the artificial distinction between economic cooperation and a dialogue on human rights. After all, you can do one without ignoring the other.

All too often, Western negotiators forget that China, too, is dependent on trade with industrialized states. While they are jostling in the queue at the doors of Chinese negotiators, Western delegations frequently behave in a way that is a far cry from Chinese aspirations to "save face". Some self-confidence and faith in the attractiveness of Western ideas might not be out of place here.

The "Market Group of Six" formed in February 1997, consisting of the United States, Japan, China, Singapore, Australia and Hong Kong, is one more important stage in developments to integrate China into the international system. Its goal is to review overall economic policy, developments in exchange rates and financial markets and their monitoring in future. An important concomitant political effect in this respect is the fact that Hong Kong's tax authorities will be integrated in the international body as an independent institution - even after reunification with China.

In an age of globalization, no state can escape the scrutiny of the international community. The Chinese government's attempt to confine its adoption of Western models to the economic system, while leaving the Communist political system unchanged, is doomed to failure in the long run. Without political concessions to the people, without allowing democratic reforms, and without granting individual and social rights, the regime will not be able to hold its own. Following Deng Xiaoping's death, it will soon be seen which route the political leaders intend to take. The alternatives are: cementing a dictatorship based on ideological repression, on the one hand, and further opening and liberalization of economic and political life, on the other.

*Volker Stanzel*

## **A World of Warring States China's Perception and Possibilities of its International Role**

### **The Concept of the "Warring States"**

The foreign affairs of any country are determined not only by the opportunities that spontaneously present themselves, but are also guided by concepts and roles determined historically and culturally. In China's history of thought, we find one tradition which most strongly influenced the formation of the Chinese concept of the international role of a state: the idea of the *zhanguo*—the "Warring States." Warring States traditionally denotes the latter half of an era of power struggles within the Chinese confederation of 771 to 221 BC - the age of Confucius and a time when most major themes of Chinese thought were conceived. The historic experience of that formative period proved to be a guide for the way in which historical, political and social developments would be understood throughout Chinese history. It is therefore no coincidence that the notion of states having foreign relations was then first coherently developed.

The major Chinese states of the time surrounded a central territory, called the Country of the King—*wangguo*—or the Country in the Centre—*zhongguo*. They in turn were surrounded by so-called Outer States—*waiguo*—which, expanding outwards, became stronger over the centuries until it was the outer state of Qin which united all Chinese states into what was later to evolve into the Han Empire. For a period of about 300 years, therefore, the Chinese experienced an era in which their world consisted of equal-ranking states (*guo*) vying with each other for supremacy. This struggle among individual states of nearly equal military strength was characterised by the use of subterfuges, strategic shifts, changing alliances, intrigues, trickery and treachery. Similar periods were often to repeat themselves throughout Chinese history. Peoples from the border regions of China were in close contact

with the empire during the long centuries that lay between the great dynasties. At times, these peoples were sufficiently strong to even fight for the emperor's throne, or at least for supremacy over some part of the Chinese territory, and the Chinese negotiated treaties with representatives of other states on the basis of equality. Due to its repetitive nature, the historical experience of a world of equally strong states contending with each other eventually took root as the formative force in Chinese political thought.

The well-known anecdote of "The Fall of Earl Chi" aptly illustrates this perception of international relations. It concerns Chi, a militarily successful head of state, not known for modesty, humility or the softer sides of human nature, who "asks" a neighboring state for some of its land. It is given to him because, so the deliberation in the neighbor's capital, the "gift" will at least buy time before Earl Chi attacks. The same happens in another state. It is only the third state at whose gates Chi's messenger knocks, the Earl of Wei, who declines to give in. Chi then succeeds in persuading both his meek neighbors to join him in fighting Wei, promising them a third of Wei's land. After three years of cruel war, shortly before Wei has to give up, Wei makes a convincing point to Chi's allies: They will be Chi's next victims. They now agree to join Wei against their dubious ally. Alliances are provisional instruments serving to reach other goals, and all partners roughly of equal rank and strength are suspected to think alike, that is, how to gain at the cost of the others.

This concept may be easily mistaken for a "realistic" approach to foreign relations. Observed over a short period of time, indeed it seems to be formed and developed in adaptation to outer circumstances. Over a longer period, however, it becomes clear that "realistic" traits are in fact an indication that goals are put aside only as long as they cannot be attained with the means available. This attitude is recognizable as soon as seemingly forgotten goals reappear at a moment when they have become attainable.

The attitude of the People's Republic since 1949 in its characteristic traits resembles that of the states we find described in ancient texts.

Each military conflict with a neighbor of China, regarded as such, seems to have arisen from a certain political situation - seems to have been a "realistic" reaction. Regarded as a whole, all these incidents point to a pattern of opportunistic revisionism. In geographical order: In 1950 China conquered Tibet. This reintegrated a country into China which had been under Manchu suzerainty during most of the Qing dynasty. The surprise attack on India in 1962 pursued a similar goal: to conquer further parts of Tibet and areas on the Southern slopes of the Himalayas which had been taken from the Manchu by the British. The Chinese support (also in hardware) of Marxist guerrillas in India, Burma and other countries of South East Asia all the way to the Philippines may have been explained ideologically. Yet it very much resembles the re-establishment of historical Chinese spheres of influence. Historical Chinese influence is even an argument used by China itself to justify its claim over the whole of the South China Sea right up to the coasts of the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia and Vietnam. The conflict with Taiwan has the characteristics of a prolonged civil war. At the same time, it is a matter of re-establishing sovereignty over an island which had been taken from the Chinese Empire by Japan in 1895. Occasional conflicts with Japan over small islands north of Taiwan may have to do with fishing rights and the exploitation of natural resources. They also concern islands which once belonged to the Okinawa archipelago whose kings until the mid-nineteenth century used to pay tribute both to the court of China and the Emperor of Japan. In the case of Korea which until it was conquered by Japan in 1895 had paid tribute to Peking, China, by entering into the Korean war, made sure that at least the Northern part of the country remained a client. In its relationship with the Soviet Union, China in 1967 began provoking minor armed conflicts to demand a revision of the "Unequal Treaties" by which the Czars had taken away Manchu territories from the Qing dynasty in the last century. Only with three of its neighbors did the People's Republic not have any kind of conflict: Pakistan and Afghanistan, precisely those two states with which there were no open accounts from the old Empire days, and with Mongolia, which had been a part of the former Manchu territory but which, after its independence, could count on strong Soviet support.

Even if it then is obvious that China is not acting "realistically" in its foreign affairs but according to grander designs, the question still is, whether the cases mentioned do not but represent simple revisionism. Revisionism might be content after the status quo ante - here equal to the time in which the Manchu gave the Chinese Empire its largest territory to date - is regained. A Warring States philosophy, on the other hand, would aim at more.

It is a certain kind of activism, of taking the initiative, which characterises the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China since 1949 and which helps discern the underlying philosophy. Beginning with the conquest of Tibet through to the support for the Khmer Rouge, the People's Republic has behaved aggressively with varying success. The rationale differed from case to case, but military means were consistently employed when political means failed to further China's foreign policy objectives. Since then, China displays a similar kind of readiness to take aggressive initiatives outside its ancient sphere of influence. Whether China vehemently protests the visit of the Dalai Lama to a Western country - which is exactly the kind of "interfering into internal affairs" it always protests if it feels to be the victim of such interference -, or demands that the WTO bends its rules to allow China entry "due to its size", it continuously tries to widen the realm of its influence. A major counterpart in this respect is the USA, something which has to be described in greater detail later on. All in all, the relevant Chinese foreign policy "vision" is predicated on an activism only through which first rank, or, in modern terminology, the rank of a world power, can be attained.<sup>151</sup>

Chinese foreign policy not only accepts the possibility of conflicts, it considers them a tool to be actively applied. China prefers to solve problems less by compromise than by carrying through a conflict. Its arguments are based more on power and strength than on fact-related considerations. China's demand for membership in the WTO because of its size is one example. Or, China refutes Western criticism of its human rights policy not on the basis of a certain interpretation of its policies, but because such criticism violates China's sovereignty. By and large, China sets about solving its international problems unilaterally.

Rarely do we observe it in coalitions with other states that might share its interests. If it at all can be said that China maintains deeply rooted relations, these are then with North Korea and Pakistan. But even there we cannot speak of common values or interests as NATO or ASEAN share. Chinese alliance policy focuses on isolated and short-term congruencies of interest (as in the case of the Human Rights World Conference). Just like in the age of the Warring States, China tends to shy away from international discussions in cases where its own vital interests are not directly involved. If they are, China prefers to represent them unilaterally.

Another aspect, albeit more emotional in nature, serves to strengthen this tendency to act in isolation. Chinese political memory of humiliations suffered during the times of colonialism is quite alive. This is illustrated by almost every, even minor, conflict with Western states or Japan. The Opium War of 1844, the destruction of the Summer Palace in 1861, or the Nanking massacre of 1937 are quickly recalled and associated, for example, with the failure of China's attempts to sponsor the Olympic Games in the year 2000, or with conflicts between Chinese and Japanese fishermen in the East China Sea.<sup>152</sup> Thus, the patient attitude of someone waiting for a chance to repay humiliation suffered exacerbates China's basic foreign policy philosophy of regarding itself as one of several territorially unsaturated competing nations striving on its own to attain the position of a superpower.

The common attribution of calm composure to China's foreign policy, that is perceived as arising out of a conviction of superiority, is erroneous. Thus, here a word is in order about the way the West traditionally understands China's foreign relations philosophy. It is embodied in the idea of a China regarding itself as the "Middle Kingdom," the civilised centre in the midst of a barbarian world not knowing states of equal rank. This notion has influenced over 200 years of Western policy vis-à-vis China and does so even today. It is, however, the Western perception of the Chinese world view. It caused and causes unfortunate misunderstandings about the way in which China pursues foreign relations<sup>153</sup>.

The idea of a Chinese Empire whose civilisation is superior to that of all other countries is indeed one of the traditions of the Chinese history of thought. It is a pre-historic theological concept, modernised by the Confucianists of the Han-Era, which has rarely determined the way foreign relations were handled. Of course, there occurred periods in Chinese history when outside contact was restricted in a way that allowed efforts by the state to translate the idea of the identity of empire and world into reality. But by and large, a centralised empire was regarded as a lofty ideal rather than the reality of imperial life. The concept of a "Middle Kingdom" whose inherent superiority allowed it to remain socially immobile as the West found it in its first encounters with Chinese culture, has been a stress reaction against the threat of foreign conquerors or colonisers. That is to say, it had a social function, a function of domestic, not foreign policy. The translation of the word *zhongguo* (the geographical description transferred from the central Warring State upon the whole of China) as "Middle Kingdom" is an exotic-sounding, and therefore tempting, misinterpretation. Today, as in the past, all countries in the world are called *guo* in Chinese. *Guo* have always been considered as originating from a basis of equal ranking—the basis for the concept of the world of Warring States.

In the West, we tend to think in terms of spheres of culture and expansion; there are proponents of Islam who divide and explain the world according to religious orientation. In the case of China, the competition—which might be called "imperialistic"—between state-like and equal-ranking entities fighting for by all means available has been the profound historical experience which defines China's understanding of its role in the international context. Therefore, in its justification of the inclusion of Tibet within its territory, China does not primarily employ arguments of cultural or religious affinity, but rather, the "imperialistic" notion that ever since the submission of one of its kings, Tibet "historically" belonged to China. Imperialistic competition for supremacy is China's philosophy of foreign relations, with the ensuing implications of an assertive China articulating its objectives in the international arena. It is therefore no coincidence that the idea of states of equal rank—the concept of a "multi-polar" world

fraught with the possibility of war,<sup>154</sup> a "world of regions" defined by the actions of regional powers—can be found in foreign policy analyses as well as in official statements. According to this view of the world China is one among many states of equal status, among which its objective is to gain supremacy.

### Contingencies of the Chinese Philosophy of Foreign Relations

The opportunistic approach to foreign affairs that accords with the Warring States concept can be discerned clearer at a time when a stronger China has more possibilities to make itself heard than in the past.<sup>155</sup> One case in point is China's human rights policy. The Chinese government's "White Book on Human Rights" of 1991 took a defensive posture by simply maintaining that China has no human rights problems. Leading up to the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993, being now in an internationally recognised stronger position than before, China represented the notion that human rights are the internal affair of sovereign nations and not a legitimate basis for outside interference. This position was then strengthened in the White Book on Human Rights of 1995. Further examples of the "new" traditional Chinese foreign policy are its arms export policy, its attitude towards the possibility of North Korean nuclear capabilities, and its policy towards Hong Kong. In each case, the basic foreign relations pattern reappears.

As China's foreign policy, like that of any country, has to correspond to, or resist, expectations of other nations, it should be of interest to discover traits of the Warring States concept in the bilateral relations China maintains with other nations, and to find out what the conditions are for it to be successfully implemented. Competitors that today's China has to contend with striving for the prime position in the Warring States arena, are Russia, India, Japan, and the United States.

Currently, both Russia and China are upgrading their relationship to a "constructive partnership" (Kosyrew). Both seek stability of their

common border, both want to limit the influence of Islamic fundamentalism, and both realise that their border regions profit from cross-border trade. Territorial questions have practically been solved. Thus, the ties of convenience developed in recent years seem to offer scope for enhanced co-operation. In the world of "Warring States", Russia to China is a neighbor sufficiently weak so as not to be a security threat. This situation might change depending on several developments. The sale of Russian goods below world market prices—such as high tech arms—to China, or the immigration of more than a million Chinese into Siberia, for example, might at some point antagonise Russia. The meaning of rising Russian nationalism is not lost on China, and conversely, Russia cannot disregard China's potential economic strength and its great power ambitions. Then there are the present and volatile developments in Central Asia. On one hand, fundamentalist Islamic thought trickles into Sinkiang and nurtures anti-Chinese sentiments of the non-Chinese inhabitants. This need not necessarily, but may possibly, develop into an explosive regional and internal problem. Sino-Russian relations - at the time being stable - will be at risk the moment one of the two "partners" perceives the other as gaining the upper hand in the quest for world power.

Both India and China seem to have recognised the advantages of peaceful bilateral relations and have made efforts to leave problem areas aside. Rivalry is at best dormant, however - no more of the "Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai" ("Indians and Chinese are blood brothers") sentiment of Nehru's days during president Jiang's visit to India in 1996. China, parallel to its course of rapprochement, exploits its position at the cost of Indian regional influence. Supporting Pakistan in the West and Burma in the East, China pursues a policy of containment vis-à-vis India. It is supporting the missile development program of Pakistan and building two naval bases for Burma which may be used by the Chinese Navy as well.<sup>156</sup> China is preparing for possible conflicts in South Asia, because in its view it has to turn the rivalry with another rising, ambitious contender for supremacy to its advantage. An Indian diplomat's comment, "The Chinese want peace along their borders - they cannot afford too many enemies when going against the US", not by chance

brings to mind the anecdote of the Earl of Chi.<sup>157</sup>

Japan and China seem to be ideal partners: Japan has the necessary capital and technology, whereas China possesses the requisite labour and provides access to its potentially enormous market. Still, the relationship is decidedly ambivalent. For one thing, emotions play an extraordinary role. Historically, Japanese public opinion manifests strong undercurrents of sympathy towards China. On the other hand, there is a high degree of antipathy against Japan in China as a result of the war. This allows Chinese leaders to mobilise anti-Japanese public sentiment anytime it seems politically useful. Seeking Japanese trade and investment, China has up to this point refrained from all too openly provoking Japan. Should it one day feel strong enough, though, any conflict of interest - even over the Senkaku Islands (Chin. Diaoyutai) - might threaten bilateral relations. China therefore employs a mixture of accommodation and intimidation to make headway against the country that, if only by the sheer strength of its economy, represents a rival for a China striving to achieve pre-eminence. The test of a Chinese atomic device on the fiftieth anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima was perhaps the first signal of a more openly aggressive attitude,<sup>158</sup> and the Chinese Foreign Minister's warning in March 1996 in Tokyo that President Clinton's upcoming visit to Japan should not "cause new problems" was another one. Japan has strengths that China cannot afford to overlook. It possesses the enormous means that a highly efficient industrialised country has at hand, the use of which is steered more rationally and in a more "modern" way than is the case in a China in the midst of modernisation. These strengths lend Japan a greater margin of security - if need be also militarily. Here, Japan might be able to count on the support of China's neighbours who have more to fear from an atavistic-expansionist Warring States-power than from the economically expanding Japan. A look at South East Asia and Taiwan proves illustrative.

Towards South East Asia China displays the attitude of a contender for supremacy versus rather minor players which should best be brought under a benevolent control permitting them to reap the benefits of submission. China's expansion in the region is creeping and primarily

economic in nature. There is a great interest in the economic rise of China and the strengthening of its market within the countries of South East Asia. This interest in a consolidated China with an improved international status ends when a strengthened Chinese role transcends that of a regionally stabilising power to become that of a power pursuing expansionist agendas. Armed conflicts are thus possible—and have occurred—over the Spratly Archipelago. Since the Chinese occupation of Mischief Reef off the Philippine coast, the ASEAN states have demanded multilateral negotiations to solve the Spratly question. Consenting in principle, China at the same time has stated adamantly its claim of an even larger maritime territory since it now applies the international laws used for the Pacific archipelago nations. This position does little to mitigate fears of future Chinese efforts to control if not all of the resources, the even more vital sea lanes traversing the South China Sea as well. Given the possibility that the USA in the future might be less willing to shoulder responsibility for the security of the region, South East Asia is more inclined to look to Japan for additional security guaranties. The question is whether and when Japan, with its tradition of post-war pacifism, might be ready to fill the growing security vacuum the US would leave behind, even if it meant a confrontation with China.

Developments closer to home - China's Taiwan-policy - might well force Japan's hand. Despite an improvement in economic co-operation, which will resemble that between an industrialised and developing country for a long time to come, the movement towards de facto Taiwanese independence has been and will be further strengthened: 75% of the votes in the March 1996 presidential election for the "status quo plus" policy of President Lee and the pro-independence party DPP are a clear indication. If the People's Republic were to tolerate this, if even only by remaining silent about it, it would be a definite setback to its strategic for re-unification. The People's Republic's increasing economic strength permits it to consider the military option with more realistic chances of success, as it has demonstrated so resolutely with its missile tests and large-scale military manoeuvres in the Taiwan Strait before the Taiwanese Parliamentary elections in late 1995 and the presidential elections in

March 1996. While this simply may have been intended as a warning signal, Chinese leaders had clearly not taken into account the resulting ground swell of alarm throughout the region and the sobering effect on Japan at a time when the country was already exasperated over the test of a Chinese atomic device.

Similarly, Japan must have been alarmed by the way China dealt with the potential North Korean nuclear weapons capability. China's relationship with South Korea is mainly defined in economic terms. North Korea, however, plays a different and more complex role. Parts of China's military still are attached emotionally to North Korea, due to their memories of the Korean war, but consider North Korea more or less a client state, a state that may be counted on to promote China's interests. Therefore, for a long time, China refused to budge from its wait-and-see-attitude and to take international responsibility by helping to minimise the danger after the threat of North Korean nuclear proliferation had been recognised. The role of protector, valuable in the context of a Warring States strategy, proved to be more important to the Chinese leadership than the very tangible threat to regional and world-wide security.

Whatever the traditions and its inclinations in its relations with China may be, Japan, in its understanding of its regional role and security policy, might find itself drawn, pushed and pulled ever more into a major adversarial role vis-à-vis China in the Western Pacific. A resulting armed conflict in East and South East Asia would be the direct result of China's strategies based on the principles of a world of Warring States.

Most open to development and at the same time the most prone to conflict in the long-term seem to be the Sino-American relations. Seen from China's perspective, the US, having inherited the regional role of the former Western colonial powers, is the one true rival which stands in its way. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the relative marginalisation of Russia, it is primarily the US that remains in a position to circumscribe the implementation of China's foreign policy objectives. And, from China's perspective, the US is by no means a passive rival either. China regards the dissolution of the Soviet empire as a Western

victory against a socialist ally. It was the US which spearheaded the policy of "peaceful change" and insured its success. As the statements of American political and economic leaders about how political change necessarily follows economic development seem to prove, this policy, be it called "containment" or "engagement", whether the American president offers to exchange state visits or not, is understood as a tactical maneuver, to be answered in kind. When this analysis is added to the underlying postulate of one Warring State rising against the dominant one, it becomes obvious, in Chinese eyes, that the US will never permit the People's Republic to develop into a superpower in its own right. So - again in China's eyes - the US deliberately undercuts China's policy towards Taiwan, undermines China's position in Tibet, remoulds "human rights" into an anti-Chinese weapon, hinders the export of Chinese arms, stands in the way of China's accession to WTO, and generally tries to bind China's strategic aims by incorporating it into collective regional security arrangements. It is the classical Warring States situation of a rising power being stymied by the power in being. This perception well explains the continuing irritation in China's reactions towards the US. Therefore, the Chinese tendency to turn any of a number of relatively small problems with the US into a greater conflict cannot be expected to decrease. Rather, China, with its growing economic strength, will consciously and increasingly try to measure its own strength against that of the US in ever riskier matters. In the case of the Chinese maneuvers before the Taiwanese presidential elections in 1996, China put into operation a long-term strategy to make the withdrawal of the US from East-/South East Asia a fact for all to see (it turned out, however, a demonstration of the American willingness to stay). It would behoove both the Chinese and the Americans to make efforts to keep problems in proportion to their relative importance lest tests of resolve escalate into armed conflict. Such efforts, however, can hardly be expected from a rationally calculating state living by the philosophy of Warring States. And, seen solely from the perspective of one of these Warring States, a seeming disaster may be nothing but the long-awaited natural turning point in the struggle between the two major contenders.

Other regions of the world do not decisively influence Chinese foreign policy. They have varying importance as economic partners and as a potential political counterbalance to the US. Regions or countries not strong enough to stand up alone to the predominant super power might one day do so on China's side; this applies to the Middle East, Latin America and Africa as well as it does to Europe. The United Nations—from the Chinese point of view—is a stage of world policy on which important developments and confrontations are reflected, but not initiated. Thus, it is generally not regarded as vital to Chinese strategies but certainly comes into play as soon as it shows some particular usefulness, as was the case of the World Conference on Human Rights.

### Conclusions

With its modernisation, China's internal developments will become more complex. Social problems and economic successes may be concentrated in different regions. Democratic movements and totalitarian structures may exist side by side. Catastrophes caused by nature or by man may throw the country back by years; scientific or technological progress may give it head starts. On the one hand therefore, China only to a certain degree will be able to translate its economic into foreign policy successes. On the other hand, it is not very likely that China will simply become more calculable and inclined to search for compromises in its foreign relations. Judging from its internal situation and the long-term prospects for economic development, it is difficult to expect the emergence of a stable China. Rather, we have to be prepared for periods of uncertainty in which China will be ready to take risks, alternating with periods of relative stability.

For some time to come, China will pursue the foreign policy objectives expounded upon above: it will bide its time in its struggle with the West—primarily the US—so as to achieve supremacy among the Warring States, or regions, of the coming century. The contradiction between what China demands and expects of itself and its limited ability

to translate these demands into reality will transform it into an incalculable player on the world stage. While its actions are hard to foretell, China, due to its size and its increasing power to make its influence felt, is potentially dangerous to peace.

Yet the trend towards multilateralism will not remain without effect upon Chinese foreign policy. As China observes and reflects on how its partners co-operate on a long-term basis, it cannot but adapt its own behaviour. This is particularly true in the sphere of economics. As a result of economic development, China's economic clout increases. Its production, consumption, and financial policy will have a greater impact on the international community. At the same time, China's vulnerability will increase correspondingly to its interdependence with the world market. It will take time for the effect of these processes to become evident. Therefore, the Chinese willingness to enter into conflicts, together with an environment rich in conflict potential, makes military conflicts emanating from China more probable than continued peace in East and South East Asia. For the most part, such conflicts would result from Chinese foreign policy strategies, and would take the form not of spontaneous and uncontrollable armed forays, but rather of relatively rational conflicts with weaker adversaries, undertaken with at least the intention of keeping them limited in scope.

This danger will decrease the more China is integrated into international dependencies and responsibilities. The understanding of its own role will inevitably be modified the more China finds itself bound into the web of international mechanisms. Furthering true multilateralism thus means Chinese recognition of the fact that it is to its own advantage if it bows to international rules and regulations.

A closed China lacking transparency has few chances to reconcile its world view to reality. The concept of a world of Warring States isolates China in the world. Yet even traditions rooting in early historic times are no natural law. They can be modified. It is therefore up to China's international partners to try to involve China in the same continuous process of learning they themselves share. This process evolves from problems new to humanity and as a result of a development which

brings peoples who once were alien into ever closer dependency upon each other. By transferring the pattern of domestic behaviour typical for a modern democracy ruled by law onto the level of international relationships, an international climate of security and peace may be produced. Through adaptation and a new definition of its interests, China might find its way from the predatory logic rooted in the world of Warring States into the world of today.