

# China–Europe Relations

Perceptions, policies and prospects

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## 12 The EU and China in the global system

*Volker Stanzel\**

Chinese, Europeans, and others, possess “mental maps” giving them orientation in the political and societal world around them – cognitive maps which have been imprinted upon their consciousness during the twentieth century. Now, however, we observe changes in the world so dramatic that we need to ask ourselves whether we still have the right maps in our minds or whether the ones we still use might not mislead us when we try to find our way ahead. China is a perfect example – now having an impact unimaginable only a decade ago and impacting the global system in ways we are yet to fully understand. Several new features characterize our world today.

### **A new international setting: the need for new “rules of the road”**

First, the end of the Cold War means more than the end to a time when two superpowers threatened each other and a large part of the world’s population faced instant extinction. The Cold War had also contributed to a world order with a high degree of both stability and complexity. The international institutions which set rules for international behaviour, such as the United Nations and its sub-organizations, or the World Bank or the IMF, remained almost as “frozen” as the overall worldwide situation, because any major change would have threatened the balance between the two superpowers and the two major blocs. The interest of the two superpowers in having institutions guide behaviour between states lay in avoiding “chaotic” conflicts which might possibly lead to a “hot war” between the United States and the Soviet Union. This interest guaranteed that international institutions were kept intact, even in phases of limited armed conflicts such as the Vietnam War or the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, or throughout the period of decolonization.

Our post-Cold War world is characterized by the atrophy, or the threatened breakdown of many of those institutional structures. As a result, the international order as we knew it is crumbling. Efforts to adapt the United Nations to the new situation by successive Secretary Generals of the United Nations indicate that we need a new world order, or at least new “rules of the road” if we want to avoid incalculable risks of multiple conflicts (even Jihad terrorism may be understood as the promise of a new “order” in an increasingly disoriented world). Those rules

may or may not evolve naturally; but the members of the international community that have a stake in its functioning will find it in their interest to take on responsibility for how a new world order appears. The appearance of new major actors on the world stage means that defining a new global order will have to involve them. China and other Asian countries, with their newly-found economic and political strength, will have to have a greater say in how the new rules for the behaviour of states are written. When we work within, and try to reshape, the global system, Asian countries need to be more involved.

The second phenomenon is the new quality of globalization. World trade expands due to the opening of new markets. World trade also expands due to the fact that industrial production has moved from "vertically integrated production" to worldwide "horizontally integrated production." The process of producing components of products at the most distant locations until assembled and shipped as one has become possible because of the globally expanding labour market. This in turn has led to continually decreasing prices. Expanding trade also means that not only traditionally tradable goods – the hardware of globalization – are making their way around the globe. The software of globalization, i.e. formerly little tradable goods, such as knowledge and information, has become mobile as well. They have become as sellable and buyable as material goods. Thus, the competitive advantages of industrialized societies – strong in knowledge, education and creativity – increasingly shrink.

The new phase of globalization has moved far beyond trade in simple material or immaterial goods. Participatory movements, emancipation and hedonistic "world culture" phenomena are traded too and have become elements of "modernization," subverting the authority of traditional structures, world views, even religions, leading in cases of extreme destabilization to what today is known as "failing" states. Asia's new economic dynamism has contributed to this development as well as to its speed – as it has to the globalization of dangers. Natural disasters that affect a country may severely limit its economic performance and thus have a negative impact on world trade. SARS, and now avian flu, demonstrate how quickly pandemic diseases may spread due to the increase in international travel. International crime, the trade in arms, humans or drugs complement the trade in goods in a negative way. The new character of globalization means that many become richer, few become poorer, while the wish to join the globalization process becomes ever stronger. With new opportunities comes the danger of new threats and the question of who will be able to devise the appropriate "rules of the road".

Lastly, we are confronted with the phenomenon of an increasing number of global centres of gravity. Here, the rise of East-Southeast Asia is the most conspicuous. This rise would not have the impact we observe without the rise of China. However, the rise of China can only be comprehended in its full dimension if we take into consideration how its economy is interwoven with the economies of the whole crescent reaching from Japan down to Australia.<sup>1</sup> The new economic and political stature of China, as well as the emergence of ASEAN, the resurgence of the Japanese economy, the dynamism of the so-called "tiger economies," the growing supra-regional policy of India and its new economic growth – all these

factors have brought about a tendency towards more cohesion among Asian countries that goes beyond the economic successes.

The region does not yet speak with one voice – far from it – but like a common thread we observe the efforts to establish new structures and organizations, and at least the will of the region to determine its own agenda.<sup>2</sup> When we say the region is a new centre of gravity in the world's economy, and is on its way to become a centre of gravity in global politics as well, then we mean that whatever such a "centre" does, its actions or non-actions may affect the whole world. Gravity centres are not the "poles" that the myth of a "multipolar world" wants to see – they are conglomerates of states of very different characteristics, not centralized entities with a unified political will. Gravity centres are rather like the centre of spider webs without a spider,<sup>3</sup> and the strings of these webs are the lines of interest that span across the globe from the sources of natural resources to laboratories where medicines against pandemics are developed, or where silly caricatures suddenly have repercussions leading to the death of demonstrators far away.

### A new international setting: old and new stakeholders

In dealing with the new environment of the twenty-first century brought about by these three phenomena,<sup>4</sup> in drawing those new "mental maps," the influence the centres of gravity can exert will be a major factor. Certainly the strongest (the US), and that of a "traditional" one (Europe), but also of the most important new one – the East Asian crescent driven forward by China's dynamism – will all push the world in new directions. How do these centres of gravity exert influence? The most important factor is their ability to create order within their own regions, and to have an impact outside too – not necessarily, but possibly also globally. They might contribute to the solution or to the aggravation of regional and global problems. For that they need the capability and the will to use economic, diplomatic and, if necessary, military resources. Another means of influence is their so-called "soft power," which more sustainably transcends economic impact and military power with its attraction and integrationist strength of values and culture. It is striking how much a point of discussion the question of China's soft power or "cultural power" has become not only in the West, but even more so in China's think tanks and media over only the past year.<sup>5</sup>

Europe and East-Southeast Asia (and in the future other "centres" as well), at the side of the United States, have all become "stakeholders" of order in the world.<sup>6</sup> For decades Japan has experienced what China and the other countries in the region are experiencing now – what they do may have global consequences, and "the crisis of one will be the crisis of all."<sup>7</sup> The Chinese government's transparency about new health threats may prevent the spread of pandemics. Good governance that prevents corruption domestically will also impede the spread of international crime. Whether the value of the RMB is allowed to freely float or not, it has an impact even on other continents. The efficient organization of the textile industry in China may mean poverty to workers in that same industry some thousand kilometres away.

China and its neighbours will have to find a new way to manoeuvre on the international stage. Here, the EU has been developing into a partner with which Asian countries approach an increasing number of common problems. ASEM (the Asia–Europe Meeting) has gradually become the most important forum for this purpose.<sup>8</sup> It has developed into a forum where both leaders of governments and government agencies as well as experts from administrations and civil society meet on a large range of global issues. It thus offers institutionalized opportunities for countries to learn about each other's views and approaches to questions concerning both Europeans and Asians – in ways that have not been possible in the past and which may influence opinion-building and help prepare operative decisions taking into regard each other's attitudes.

### *The EU and China*

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the EU and China in 1975,<sup>9</sup> and despite signing a "Cooperation Agreement" in 1985, the EU was for a long time of secondary importance to China's foreign policy, and vice versa.<sup>10</sup> This has changed. It has changed in the economic field already, and is changing politically as well. Today, the EU is China's most important trading partner in the world, with a total trade volume of ca. €200 billion (€150 billion China to EU; €50 billion EU to China).<sup>11</sup> Of the EU's external trade, 10 per cent takes place with China. The example of Airbus – about to build an assembly plant in China – shows the "intensity" of technology transfer between the two sides,<sup>12</sup> cooperation in the Galileo satellite navigation system, or the nuclear research reactor ITER, all indicate the progress of scientific cooperation. In education, there is the successful example of the China Europe International Business School (CEIBS) in Shanghai and a China–Europe Law School in Beijing.

The EU provides technical assistance for a broad range of projects in China, including the organization of village-level elections, including the training of observers and producing education material for the voters, and it pursues a human rights dialogue. Both China and the EU today call their relationship "strategic." That is to say, if we follow the definition supplied by the EU's representative to China, Serge Abou, that the areas of cooperation cover China's "strategic needs,"<sup>13</sup> and that it is in Europe's interest to contribute to the success of China's reforms as China's stability and prosperity are "an indispensable factor for global balance." This becomes manifest in an annual "strategic dialogue," five regular "expert level" meetings, and twenty "sectoral dialogues" covering topics ranging from political analyses to social or environmental issues.<sup>14</sup>

This new quality of relations was difficult to foresee or forecast. For China, the EU – and its predecessor the European Community – was an organization difficult to understand. China tended to see mainly the irreconcilability of national interests.<sup>15</sup> Since 1990, the EU with its transformation and enlargement was even harder to understand. China's view of the world was an inherently traditional one: countries vying with each other for, if not supremacy, at least advantages over one another. The EU seemed to be an example of that kind of world. A handful of countries,

nine at the beginning of the EU–China relationship, bound together by the need to cooperate, but led by whom? Correspondingly, China's expectations were that one or the other of the stronger European countries sooner or later would take the lead and dominate Europe (and possibly stand up to the "sole remaining superpower").<sup>16</sup>

While the usage of this multipolar world rhetoric continued (and continues occasionally even today),<sup>17</sup> with increasing depth of EU–China relations, comprehension of the EU in China increased. The progress of comprehension may have been aided by the necessity to find not only economically viable but also politically reliable partners for China's reform and opening policy. Its own region, important as it was, presented complications, China's peace-oriented policies notwithstanding. Deng Xiaoping, after China had gone to war four times during the first thirty years of the People's Republic's existence, prescribed a policy of keeping a low profile in foreign affairs and making an effort to create a "peaceful environment" for China's concentration on its economic development.<sup>18</sup> Despite the success of this policy, China at times even agreed to territorial compromises, in creating an "added value" of trust beyond close economic relations, thus facilitating both China's economic development and its integration into the world economy, its major gains were achieved not in the arena of that new centre of global gravity. In Asia, tensions still abound.

Firstly, for some years now, China's "neo-mercantilist" strategies to assure its supplies of natural resources have been the cause of competitive tensions in the region, and increasingly globally. The competition over energy resources exacerbates existing rivalries between China and some of its neighbours. China and Japan are in a contest over a future Russian oil pipeline in Siberia, and at the same time over a small offshore gas field in the East China Sea. Despite flourishing economic relations, the Chinese–Japanese conflict over the former Japanese Prime Minister's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine for the war dead (including fourteen "Class-A" war criminals) and other nettlesome issues brought the political relationship between Japan and China to their lowest point since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1972. South Korea and Japan are in a phase of deteriorating bilateral relations over both territorial and moral questions. The situation in the South China Sea is calm, yet the territorial problems there are left unresolved; ethnic and religious tensions often lead to armed violence in Southeast Asia. The proliferation of regional institutions reflects the awareness of the potential of a new global gravity centre here, yet so far there is no working mechanism for solving the problems or resolving the conflicts of the region. ASEAN + 3, ASEAN + 1, the East Asian Community (EAC), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), or APEC do not possess sufficient coordinating powers to obligate the leaders of the East–Southeast Asian gravity centre in a way that would enable them to act in concert. Possibly the fact that the countries of the region possess very different political systems makes it even more difficult to establish institutions which would require partly giving up national sovereignty in order to gain in influence collectively.<sup>19</sup>

Possibly Europe, with its economic strength, became the attractive partner with which to share a "strategic" partnership and promised the many advantages that both sides enjoy today. Both Europe and China had much to offer each other in terms of economic profits. Chinese experts today understand that EU countries are on the path towards more unity in structures and policies, struggling with the need to combine integration with enlargement, and China's leaders and institutions display patience in waiting for a more cohesively acting partner.<sup>20</sup> China's official view of the main features of EU-China relations thus is that of a "solid political foundation and strong mutual trust"; "emerging as each other's key trading Partner with great potentials"; "enjoying wider consensus on major global and regional issues"; "having found the right way to resolve differences through dialogue."<sup>21</sup> Is it a surprise that 2004 became the "Year of Europe" in China?<sup>22</sup>

### *Mutual adaptation efforts*

To appraise the development towards the present quality of the relationship, the question remains how Europeans saw and explained that process themselves.<sup>23</sup> At least some official observers in China have a clear understanding of what happened: "After about three years' contest, the leaders of Western European countries found that, instead of collapsing under pressure, China enjoyed rapid economic growth, internal stability, enhanced national cohesion and elevated international status. Facing the hard reality, the Western European countries, proceeding from their own interests, had to readjust their China policy and resume normal relations with China step by step," writes Mei Zhaorong, foreign policy advisor to China's leaders and former diplomat. Ambassador Mei continues for pages in that triumphalist tone.<sup>24</sup> If an influential person like Mei takes that point of view, it deserves attention and consideration.

On the European side, have economic advantages pushed aside political aspects of the EU-China relationship that had hindered mutual accommodation? The policy of reform and opening to Europeans had indeed for a long time been tied to the expectation of farther-reaching political change. The appearance of democratic movements ("Democracy Wall," Wei Jingsheng, etc.) in the early 1980s, various reform initiatives by two consecutive General Secretaries of the Communist Party of China (Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang) and, lastly, the student demonstrations on Tiananmen Square had seemed to confirm that expectation. Later, the upheavals throughout the Communist world after the fall of the Berlin Wall had led to the assumption that China would experience a similar fate. In hindsight, it seems almost ironic that the spectacle of Tiananmen may have impeded an armed reaction by East German authorities, thus allowing the fall of the Berlin Wall. The spectacle of the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Iron Curtain and the Soviet Empire in due course may well have been the decisive warning signal to Chinese leaders to prevent similar developments in China. The danger of what during the days of *Ostpolitik* used to be called "change by *rapprochement*" was certainly not lost on China, where the party leader appealed in the early 1990s that it was necessary for China to build a "Great Wall of Steel" in their hearts and souls against Western

"bourgeois contamination." Deng Xiaoping argued that reform and opening meant that "a few flies" might come in through the window, but that certainly political liberalization along the Western model was out of the question. The present "fourth generation" leaders in China have echoed that position with the 2006 "White Paper on Democracy," which argues that Western style democracy is not a suitable model for China.<sup>25</sup>

The discussion in Europe of whether or not trade might promote political change subsided after the Asia crisis of 1997-99. China's economic and societal change became fast and far-reaching and created a situation so unknown and fresh that recipes from Cold War times quickly became outdated.<sup>26</sup> The various strategy papers coming from the European Commission in Brussels reflect well the changing perception: emphasizing "constructive engagement" (1995) via the objective of a "comprehensive partnership" (1998) to the effort to define "shared interests and challenges" (2003)<sup>27</sup> until they arrive in 2005 at the following, now quite concrete, objectives of the EU's China policy:

- to engage China further, both bilaterally and on the world stage, through an upgraded political dialogue;
- to support China's transition to an open society based upon the rule of law and respect for human rights;
- to encourage the integration of China in the world economy through bringing it fully into the world trading system, and supporting the process of economic and social reform that is continuing in China;
- to raise the EU's profile in China.<sup>28</sup>

This adaptation of the EU's China policy to the changes occurring in the country follows the orientation of the Commission's Asia strategy papers and is part of the EU's Asia policy, which today includes all the dimensions of Europe's Common Foreign and Security Policy, with its engagement in the ASEM process, the ARF, formerly with KEDO, as well as the EU's participation in various UN Peace-keeping Operations in Asia. It is therefore more than simply the question of whether it had become imperative to use both chances of cooperation and of new economic opportunities. The EU has reacted to a development of China, which has brought about changes in its economy (so much so that industrialized countries discuss whether China is not already a full-fledged market economy) and in its society, in its role in the world to put it at the core of that new East-Southeast Asian centre of global gravity. Constructive cooperation across the board therefore has become an evident necessity for an EU that is occupied with global developments.<sup>29</sup>

### *New challenges for the relationship*

Only since about 2005 has a new problem arisen for both the EU and China in their relationship. It is of an international, fundamental and very new nature. During the past few years international concerns have been increasing that

China's needs for energy and other resources will change the situation on the most important world commodity markets. In turn, concerns in China rise over whether the country has sufficient means available to secure supplies of the commodities it needs if it wants to continue its economic growth.<sup>30</sup> In the oil market at present, China makes efforts to control its supplies from the oil wells all the way to China's coast, signing exclusive agreements with producer countries, buying or building oil exploring and trading companies, and developing strategies to defend the oil routes or to develop land-based lines of supply. This is at variance with the strategy of the majority of oil-consuming countries who, after 1974, and within the framework of the International Energy Agency, found it most rational to leave energy supply security to the markets. China's strategy might possibly create tensions which would be detrimental to its overall objective of maintaining a "peaceful development,"<sup>31</sup> and might lead to conflict with the EU as well.<sup>32</sup>

There is a marked contrast between, on the one hand, the effort to explain China's objective of creating "win-win" situations for itself and all its partners,<sup>33</sup> of drawing even on the tradition of an admiral of the fifteenth century to show that China through the millennia pursued the Confucian principle to pacify through its model and to create harmony between all countries, conquering "in greatest benevolence without war" (Confucius),<sup>34</sup> and, on the other hand, an attitude that has become increasingly self-confident and even risk-friendly. One example of that attitude is the concerted international campaign to receive support for China's "Anti-Secession Law" of March 2005, which negatively influenced the EU's drive towards lifting the arms embargo against China.<sup>35</sup> Another one is Beijing's six-month-long campaign to change the dynamics of reforming the Security Council of the United Nations. Armed with the argument that UN reform must take more time for deliberation, must take into account the interests of the Third World and should be "democratic," special emissaries paid a series of visits to most countries in the world. Independent of the actual discussion in New York they made one thing plain: the proposals tabled so far would not meet Beijing's approval – a strong point in view of Beijing's veto power but carrying the risk of antagonizing not only the group of four countries (plus some yet unnamed African countries) hoping for a permanent seat on the Security Council, but also the large number of countries of the South hoping for greater influence on world affairs through a better working UN.

That risk-friendly and value-free diplomacy now seems to bring about more risks than solutions. A case in point is Iran. China is discovering that the new role which it claims also means that now it carries more of the burden of responsibility should there appear a country in the Middle East developing or possessing nuclear arms. In the case of Sudan, Zimbabwe or Venezuela, China has argued that its energy needs required good relations even with these countries because China had no alternatives. But what if the regimes supported by China later turn out to be dangers for their neighbours or their own people? With all its economic growth China has acquired a greater role in the world (which it sees as its due), and now finds itself confronted with the need to take on responsibilities of a dimension

never truly imagined before, except rhetorically.<sup>36</sup> China has developed successfully into a country of which the world expects that it not only will abide by global rules but it will want to have a say in how these rules are being rewritten.

At the same time China finds itself tied into a web of dependencies, it discovers that its new-found strength and freedom allow room for manoeuvre but simultaneously subjugate it with all its regional neighbours to common constraints. While in the past Asian countries were able to wait for decisions of global importance to be taken by others, their new strength, their new power to influence global events, gives them the responsibility to analyse situations and to devise strategies on their own.

Here lies the problem: China has come far on its way from simply integrating into the world economy to integrating fully into the political world community. A country that depends in its development and prosperity on what is happening in the world will try to influence the making of the rules of the game. But in which way? A "world power" may well try the unilateralist option, forcing its will upon its partners. Or, it may try to create "coalitions of the willing", creating alliances that help it get its way. Lastly, it may try to make use of international organizations and institutions in order to arrive at compromises most satisfactory to a majority of the states involved.

The question here is: in view of the overall problems in East-Southeast Asia, whether China and its neighbours will discover that bilateral solutions as "traditional" nation-states are not sufficient any more to deal with the consequences of a dissolving world order and dynamically progressing globalization processes. Even traditional notions of balance of power, or of "multipolarity" of nation-states have so far not proved able to help get very far in developing the new "rules of the road" for the world. In a world of interdependence, a world of different actors needing each other to exist and develop, in such a world it proves more advantageous to represent one country's or one region's interest together with that of others. The more "multilateralist" the approach, the more partners are involved, the more efficient a solution can be.<sup>37</sup> International rules and norms as alternatives to the use of armed or non-armed force are the foundation of international policies in the age of interdependence. Cooperating in the global community multilaterally therefore also has become the task and responsibility of East Asian countries as they wish to develop a global policy. If it wants to pursue a sustainable policy reflecting and using its strength, China will have to bring its neighbours in its region along.<sup>38</sup> To come to terms with its new status as a world power and the heavy burdens of responsibilities that it acquired along the way, China and the countries of East Asia will have to join other countries in exploring ways to at least minimize the risk and to maximize the opportunities derived from the new globalization processes.

### Cooperating on global governance

Multilateral cooperation in itself does not mean that there are already new "rules of the road," not mention a new world order. For that, an overarching universal framework is indispensable. The United Nations in the twenty-first

century will remain the most important forum of global rule setting. There is no other organization that commands comparable global legitimacy even though it is not a legitimacy that is truly democratically based. To shape the world of the new century, however, the United Nations cannot remain as it was created in 1949. It has to reflect a world consisting of almost 200 countries. Before the UN can define "rules of the road" for the world, it therefore needs to be reformed itself. China, represented in the UN as Asia's sole P-5 country, possesses sufficient global weight to contribute to the reform of the United Nations. The danger, if we do not get an efficient, reformed UN would be that different forms of cooperation in smaller circles will evolve, disregarding the interests of a larger number of states.

A major factor in creating a stronger UN would be contributing to developing further international law. Legally bound international relations would increase accountability and transparency of the way states deal with each other. They would improve the rule of law over the use of sheer power in international relations. It is not enough to subscribe to the values of international law – the rule of international law can only be a basis for international relations if countries accord to this law precedence over national law. To give new stability to the world and to replace the crumbling structures of the Cold War age with a new world order shaping the norms of future stability, a conviction of the importance of international law will have to grow worldwide, and foremost in the countries forming the new centres of gravity. This is the most concrete part of the task facing China in the twenty-first century: strategic problem-solving multilaterally and mainly by rebuilding the United Nations. "Strategic" means that common problems have to be identified together and solutions have to be charted and implemented together. Such "strategic partnerships" are possible only if all involved work from the same basis. Anachronistic ideas of statehood or of state sovereignty will only lead to traditional national solution efforts – bound to fail – instead of transnational ones, adequate to today's global challenges.<sup>39</sup>

Therefore, enhancing the existing mode of cooperation between the EU and China by venturing into the core areas of global governance may help overcome the "new challenge" to the relationship consisting in the burden of new responsibilities for China and the countries of its region. The two sides might therefore examine how to systematically and strategically approach major concrete issues and areas such as the following, prioritized not in order of urgency but of long-term impact (Bates Gill's chapter in this volume also considers how many of these issues might also be open to greater China–Europe–United States cooperation):<sup>40</sup>

#### 1 *Global governance:*

- How to reform the UN? Do we need additional global or regional institutions with the rise of new economic powers among the countries of the South?

- How to reform international law? How to establish an international rule of law (including in the area of human rights)?
- How to redefine "state sovereignty" in the age of globalization, how to promote regional and inter-regional cooperation? How to support the cooperation of regional organizations?

#### 2 *Global economic relations:*

- How to avoid international conflicts over energy and other vital resources?
- How to solve conflicts over global trade liberalization inside and outside the WTO?
- How to assure internationally coordinated, efficient and sustainable environment policies?
- How to assure sustainable development in transforming and modernizing countries?

#### 3 *International crisis management:*

- How to develop cooperative strategies and policies to deal with terrorism?
- How to cooperatively combat and prevent international crime (trade in humans, drugs, arms, money laundering)?
- How to deal with, and prevent, global health risks?

#### 4 *International conflict management:*

- How to make the international non-proliferation regimes more efficient, how to deal with violators?
- How to put into place workable and efficient peacekeeping structures and forces?
- How to prevent or solve armed regional and internal conflicts?
- How to support states threatened with the "failure" of their statehood, how to eradicate its root causes, how to "manage" radical ideologies dangerous to peace?

#### *Value partners?*

For Europe, the question arising from the increasing intensity of the EU–China relationship is one of its prospects. If the EU and China in the global system have become "interest partners" in that they pursue similar interests and objectives multilaterally and in the UN system, are they then what we might call "value partners" too? Many differences persist. The question of the rule of law and of human rights in China has been defused to a degree by the evolving human rights concept in China, which is best represented by the fact that since 2004 there is a human rights clause in the Chinese constitution. Yet as long as there are arbitrary justice, torture, hard labour camps, restricted press and media freedom and limited individual, religious (Tibet, Christian churches) and social freedom, whenever there is

a more conspicuous individual case it will still easily turn into a political problem between the two sides.

Then there is the question of the EU arms embargo, and the question of peaceful or non-peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question.<sup>41</sup> There are economic disputes, where mainly the problem of the violation of intellectual property rights outsizes anything that has happened in the past when Japan, South Korea and others began their economic take-off. The question whether the EU will grant China Market Economy Status (MES) has turned from a question of only a technical nature into one of political symbolism. The problematic nature of the question of value partnership between the EU and China becomes starkly clear when seen in comparison with Europe's relationship to the US.<sup>42</sup> The transatlantic relationship is based on values and thus for Europe supersedes all other relationships. Even though some Chinese think tankers speculate that economic realities will at some point force Europe to stand against the US,<sup>43</sup> the majority realize that, in comparison, there is an imbalance in the EU–China relationship in that the EU in most cases tends to have more understanding for American objectives and interests than for China's.<sup>44</sup> If efficiency and trust of the future EU–China relationship is contingent upon shared values, then, from the European point of view, that inevitably needs to be addressed at some point.<sup>45</sup>

These differences are not matters to be resolved easily simply by relying on common interests – it is in the cultural distance that remains even in the age of globalization where the difference between interest and value partnership lies. This distance results from different histories and different cultural developments.<sup>46</sup> Therefore the best that Chinese and Europeans – and others – can do today is lead an open dialogue on value questions. It is not just the “hard facts” of politics and economics that decide the quality of the EU–China relationship and the limits and the potential of cooperation in the international arena. More decisive in the long run is “cultural” exchange, an exchange on “values” in the widest sense.<sup>47</sup> Because values are involved, such an exchange is not easy – it is the question of how to deal with alien ways of thinking and behaving. Therefore, only if cultural exchange is dense, will societies in due time be able to understand each other and each other's values – values upon which interests are based. Mutual comprehension provides the basis for productive cooperation in both politics and economics.

If Chinese and Europeans know so much about each other today and are able to cooperate fruitfully, they owe it to a high degree to the cultural exchange between their countries during past decades and centuries. Such a cultural exchange would be less sustainable were it confined to institutionalized exchange. Due to the process of globalization our societies have an increasing number of partners worldwide. That might lead to a relative decrease in importance for existing partnerships. Governments on their own can only achieve so much. This then is the field of civil society and the day-to-day encounters in shared experiences. Only the innumerable actors that constitute a “civil society” have the combined potential to initiate an exchange of knowledge on values, philosophies, and visions that may come to constitute a robust basis upon which political and economic leaders can build. Therefore, to draw those new “mental maps” in the twenty-first century, both in China, in Asia, and in Europe, is less and less

a task for politics and business. It is more than ever a task for both European and Chinese society.<sup>48</sup>

### **Outlook: the EU and China in the new international setting**

A close relationship with Europe promises China economic and political benefits, and support in various ways for its policy of reform and opening. In comparison, defining China's relationship to its superpower neighbour, the United States, or achieving more cohesiveness in its own, politically and economically diverse, East Asian region, is more complicated and problematic. For Europe, in turn, to develop close relations with the fastest and largest of the newly rising economic (and increasingly political) powers of East Asia opens new and promising economic and trade opportunities, and allows cooperation with an ever more influential partner in tackling global and regional questions.

Thus, the EU–China relationship has seen marked and rapid improvements across the board. Today, Europe is China's most important trading partner in the world, China is Europe's most important trading partner in Asia, Europe supports with a number of measures China's reform policy, both cooperate in science and technology, and both lead several dialogues on major bilateral and multilateral issues.

Towards the end of the decade, however, the EU and China find themselves confronted with a new international setting characterized by an increasingly unstable international environment as well as forces of globalization that subvert existing national and international institutions and value systems. The challenge for the two centres of gravity in the world, Europe and East Asia (with China as the centrepiece), as much as for the United States, therefore consists in jointly trying to define new global “rules of the road” or, better, a new international order. The growing intensity of their cooperative relationship would seem to facilitate that task. There is, however, a new and growing obstacle which carries the potential of impeding closer EU–China cooperation on major problems. It is the increased awareness in China that a greater role in world affairs brings along a greater burden of responsibilities. Whether China will be able to shoulder that burden and play an accordingly constructive role commensurate with its new strength remains to be seen.

The EU and China therefore need to work constructively on two strategies. Dedicating themselves to a multilateralist approach in cooperating on concrete questions of global governance would be the short/medium-term one. Thus the reform of the United Nations, adapting global economic relations to the changes caused by the newly rising economic powers, cooperating in both crisis and conflict management should be on the agenda of the so-called strategic partnership between the two.<sup>49</sup> A more medium-long-term strategy would be a deliberate effort to overcome the value distance and the cultural gap still existing between Europe and China. The objective here would be to aim, over time, at creating a true value partnership enhancing the existing interest partnership in a similar way as is the case at present between the Atlantic allies.

## Notes

\* The views expressed herein are solely the author's personal views and in no way represent official positions of the German Government.

- 1 Fifty per cent of China's exports globally, and 60 per cent of its exports to the EU are processed goods: products that have been assembled from semi-finished goods imported mainly from other Asian countries. Also, see Bao Hong, "An Analysis of the 'China Factor'," in *International Understanding*, Vol. 1 (2006), pp. 17–22; and Thomas Heberer, *Die Rolle Chinas in der internationalen Politik* (China's Role in International Politics) (Bonn: German Development Institute, 2006), pp. 1–37. More generally, see Volker Stanzel, "Asia's Role in the World: A View from Europe," in Xuewu Gu (ed.), *Europe and Asia* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2002); John Humphrey/Dirk Messner, "Unstable Multipolarity? China's and India's Challenges for Global Governance" in *die briefing paper 1/2006* (German Development Institute, Bonn: 2006).
- 2 See, for example, Françoise Nicolas, "East Asian Economic Integration – Past Experience, Current State of Play and Future Prospects," in Willem van der Geest (ed.), *The European Union's Strategic Interests in East Asia*, Vol. II (Brussels: European Institute for Asian Studies/Nomisma, 2005); and Heribert Dieter, *Bilaterale Freihandelsabkommen im asiatisch-pazifischen Raum* (Bilateral Free Trade Agreements in the Asia-Pacific Region) (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2006); also Liu Jiayang and Yan Xuetong, "Some Tentative Thoughts on Establishing an East Asian Security Community," in *Foreign Affairs Journal*, Vol. 71 (March 2004), pp. 73–88.
- 3 Kay Möller, however, preferred to speak of "nerve centers of international politics." See Kay Moeller, *Für eine europäische Fernostpolitik* (For a European Far East Policy) (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2004), p. 7.
- 4 David Shambaugh's analysis comes to the conclusion that there are actually four "principal trends that define the new global order: China's rise; US military supremacy and unparalleled power; the EU's increasing coherence and economic weight; the acceleration of technological and economic globalization." See David Shambaugh, "The New Strategic Triangle: U.S. and European Reactions to China's Rise," in *The Washington Quarterly* (Summer 2005), pp. 7–25.
- 5 A well known Chinese think-tank director, whose identity I withhold, observed in a discussion in April 2006: "It is China's responsibility to be a teacher of the world." Also as a very recent example: "Shijie pingshuo Zhongguo ruanshili" (The World Criticizes China's Soft Power), in *Global Times*, 2 June 2006, p. 1, or "Meiguo xiang Zhongguo xuexi shema?" (What Can the U.S. Learn from China?), in *Global Times*, 13 June 2006. For Western views of China's soft power potential see Joseph S. Nye, "The Rise of China's Soft Power," *The Wall Street Journal Asia*, 29 December 2005; Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang, "Sources and Limits of China's 'Soft Power'," in *Survival* Vol. 48, No. 2 (Summer 2006), pp. 17–36; Sebastian Bersick, "Political Issues Shaping EU–China Relations," *Briefing Paper*, Europe China Academic Network, June 2006. Aptly, Michael Yahuda proposed the term "soft foreign policy" for a situation where the use of "power" is not yet required, or possible.
- 6 It is not any more a question of only China becoming a "responsible stakeholder" as Robert B. Zoellick in his since famous statement to the National Committee on US–China Relations on 21 September 2005 has argued (<http://www.state.gov/s/d/rem/53682.htm>), it is a question of the responsibility of all the major players confronted with a new and fluid international situation. For some time, the question was one of "managing" China – a concept which Robert Kagan has proved to be out of date: Robert Kagan, "The Illusion of 'Managing' China," *The Washington Post*, 15 April 2005. Compare also Frank Umbach, "Veränderungen im Verhältnis der Machtfaktoren zueinander" (Changes in Power Factor Relationships) in *Trend*, (2003), pp. 40–4; and David Shambaugh, "European and American Approaches and Policies Toward China: Different Beds, Same Dreams?" (*Lecture at IFRI Centre Asie*, Paris, 10 January 2002).
- 7 Tony Blair, "Idealismus wird zur Realpolitik" (Idealism Becomes Realpolitik), in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 30 May 2006, p. 10., and Blair's foreign policy speeches of 21 March 2006 (London), 27 March 2006 (Canberra) and 26 May 2006 (Washington).
- 8 See, for example, the excellent overview in Japan Center for International Exchange/University of Helsinki, Network for European Studies, *ASEM in its Tenth Year: Looking Back, Looking Forward* (Tokyo/Helsinki, 2006), and Council for Asia–Europe Cooperation (ed.), *The Rationale and Common Agenda for Asia–Europe Cooperation* (Tokyo/London, 1997). Also see Frank Umbach loc cit., and Christian Hauswedell, "A German View of European-Asian Relations," Lecture in Canberra, Australia, 21 April 2004.
- 9 Even before the People's Republic had assumed China's seat in the UN in 1971, Beijing had proposed the establishment of diplomatic relations with the European Community. On early relations see Oskar Weggel, *Weltgeltung der VR China* (Global Role of the PR China) (Hamburg 1986), and Stefan Friedrich, "Europa und China in den neunziger Jahren" (Europe and China during the Nineties), in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B27/98 (1998). Most interesting is a comparison with the situation only a few decades earlier, see "Schriften des Forschungsinstituts der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik," *Die Außenpolitik Chinas* (The Foreign Policy of China) (München/Wien: Oldenbourg, 1975), pp. 281–6.
- 10 See Gustav Kempf (Volker Stanzel), *Chinas Außenpolitik* (China's Foreign Policy) (München/Wien: Oldenbourg, 2002), pp. 123–30; also see Oskar Weggel, "Chinas Außenpolitik am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts: China and the EU, Apple of the Eye" (China's Foreign Policy at the End of the Twentieth Century) in *China Aktuell*, vol. 01/99 (January 1999), pp. 34–8.
- 11 2005 figures from Eurostat. Approximately \$74 billion EU to China, \$143 billion China to Europe, total \$217 billion. For comparison, US–China trade: \$49 billion US to China, \$162 billion China to US, total \$211 bn; \$100 billion Japan to China, \$84 billion China to Japan, for a total of \$184 billion. Also see Zhang Zuqian's and Robert Ash's chapters in this volume.
- 12 Serge Abou, "The EU and China: Towards a Mature Partnership" (note that he speaks of *legal* technology transfer), speech in Beijing, 7 April 2006.
- 13 Abou, *ibid.* As for the Chinese point of view, no one has given a better definition than the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao: "'Strategic' means that the cooperation should be long-term and stable, bearing on the larger picture of China–EU relations. It transcends the differences in ideology and social systems and is not subjected to the impact of individual events that occur from time to time. 'Partnership' means that the cooperation should be equal, mutually beneficial and win-win. The two sides should base themselves on mutual respect and mutual trust, endeavor to expand converging interests and seek common ground on the major issues while shelving differences on the minor ones." See Wen Jiabao, "Vigorously Promoting Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between China and the European Union," Lecture in Brussels, 6 May 2004.
- 14 Topics of expert level meetings: Migration; Human Rights; Asian Affairs; Nonproliferation; Conventional Arms Exports. The (irregular) sectoral dialogues concern Customs, Energy, Textile Trade, etc.
- 15 See Feng Zhongping, "EU's China Policy Analyzed," in *Contemporary International Relations* (hereafter: CIR) 8/4 (1998); Zhou Hong (ed.), *Da-Oumeng, Xin-Ouzhou* (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehuikexue Chubanshe, 2005); also Ding Yuanhong, "EU Enlargement and European Integration," in *Foreign Affairs Journal*, Vol. 71 (March 2004), pp. 89–93. Also see Stefan Friedrich, "China's Policy vis-à-vis the European Union. Interests, Context, and Implications for Europe," in *China Aktuell* (Hamburg), November 1997; and Xu Zhixian, "On the Foreign Strategy and the Trend of China Policy of the

- US, Western Europe, and Japan at the Turn of the Century," in *Contemporary International Relations*, No. 8 (1998). Also see Dai Bingran's overview of European studies in China in this volume. It is to be admitted that even for Europeans it is not that easy to comprehend how the EU's foreign (and China) policy is being made, considering that it is not the European Commission but still the member states via their Common Foreign and Security Policy mechanism who are responsible.
- 16 See Xue Mouhong, "Die neue Weltordnung: Vier Mächte und eine Supermacht?" (The New World Order. Four Powers and One Superpower?), in: *Beijing Review*, 39/1995; Liu Sun/Li Shaopeng, Li Wenkai, and Sun Botao, *Ouruoba* (Europe) (Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Chubanshe, 1997); Donald W. Klein, "Japan and Europe in Chinese Foreign Relations," in Samuel S. Kim (ed.), *China and the World. Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998).
- 17 Dai Bingran, "The EU's Role in the Post-Cold War Period: The Road to Becoming One of the Poles in the New Multipolar World," in Xuewu Gu (ed.), *Europe and Asia*, op. cit.; Shen Qiang, "Trend Towards a New Multipolar World in the Context of Multilateral Relations of States in Asian Geopolitics," in *Foreign Policy Journal*, Vol. 74 (December 2004), pp. 12–23.
- 18 See Ruan Zongze, "Safeguarding World Peace and Promoting Common Development – How Deng Xiaoping's Diplomatic Ideas Came into Being and their Rich Contents," in *Foreign Affairs Journal*, Vol. 73 (September 2004), pp. 1–7. On the official Chinese view of China's regional policy see also Jin Guihua, "Developments Trends of East Asian Cooperation – A Perspective from the East Asia Summit," in *Foreign Policy Journal*, Vol. 79 (March 2006), pp. 73–6. Cf. also Jochen Buchsteiner, "Asiatische Zukunftsmusik" (Future Tunes of Asia), in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 17 December 2005.
- 19 See Manfred Mols, "Probleme und neue Herausforderungen in Ost- und Südostasien" (Problems and New Challenges in East and Southeast Asia) in *KAS/ Auslandsinformationen* 5/06 (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Berlin: 2006), pp. 21–46.
- 20 See Dai Bingran, loc. cit.; and Department of Policy Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China, *China's Foreign Affairs* (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 2004), pp. 331–6.
- 21 Ibid., pp. 331–2.
- 22 *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 12 February 2004, pp. 26–9. Also, see David Shambaugh, "China and Europe: The Emerging Axis," *Current History* (September 2004), pp. 243–7; and his chapter in this volume.
- 23 After all, one might possibly indeed call "the history of the relations between China and Europe (...) a history of inconsistency on the part of the Beijing regime ..." See Pierre Baudin, "China und die Europäische Union: Zwiespältige Beziehungen" (China and the European Union: Ambivalent Relations), in: *KAS/ Auslandsinformationen* 5/06 (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Berlin: 2006), pp. 47–71.
- 24 Mei Zhaorong, "Sino-European Relations in Retrospect and Prospect," *Foreign Affairs Journal*, Vol. 79 (March 2006), pp. 17–27.
- 25 See chapter I of Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, *Building of Political Democracy in China*, Beijing, 2005.
- 26 This change often carries with it political implications which are a far cry from anything happening in the Soviet Union in the past and therefore necessitate new analyses; cf., as one conspicuous example, China Society for Human Rights Studies, *Inclusion of Human Rights in the Constitution*, Beijing 2004.
- 27 The difference lies mainly in the increasingly solid substance to both the economic and the political issues to be discussed jointly, describing thus the path towards the establishment of the above-mentioned sectoral dialogues. As often, some member states had been ahead of the Commission in this development as shown by Germany's East Asia Strategy Paper of 2002 which already had tried to place national economic interests in a balanced relationship with global political and security interests. Cf. <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/infoservice/download/pdf/asien/ostasien.pdf> (with English language version).
- 28 Consult the EU Commission's website: [http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external\\_realtions/china/intro/index.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_realtions/china/intro/index.htm). Developments have thus been faster than expected. See Frank Umbach and Andreas Fulda, "Zur Zukunft der EU–China–Beziehungen im 21. Jahrhundert" (On the Future of EU China Relations in the Twenty-first Century), in *ASIEN*, Vol. 89 (October 2003), pp. 47–56.
- 29 See Hanns W. Maull, "Hat Europa eine Asienpolitik? Braucht es eine?" (Does Europe Have an Asia Policy? Does It Need One?), *Speech on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the German Association for Asian Studies*, Berlin 5 April 2006; William Wallace and Young Soogil (ed.), *Asia and Europe. Global Governance as a Challenge to Co-operation*, (Tokyo/Washington, D.C.: Council for Asia–Europe Cooperation, 2004); Sebastian Bersick, op. cit.; Christian Hauswedell, op. cit.; and several contributions in Bates Gill and Gudrun Wacker (eds.), *China's Rise: Diverging U.S.–EU Perceptions and Approaches* (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2005). A comparison of US and EU policies towards China or an analysis of the US' China policy, however relevant, remains as much outside the limited scope of this paper as the equally important China–Japan or the China–Russia relationship. Therefore, literature on these topics is not referred to here, but see the chapters in this volume by Bates Gill, Ruan Zongze, and David Shambaugh.
- 30 See David Hale, "China's Insatiable Appetite," in *Asian Wall Street Journal*, 16 May 2005; Frank Umbach, *Future Chinese Energy Security Strategies: Implications for China's Foreign and Security Policy* (Berlin: DGAP paper, May 2006). See also C. Fred Bergsten, Bates Gill, Nicholas R. Lardy, and Derek Mitchell, *China: The Balance Sheet* (New York: Public Affairs, 2006); Xuewu Gu and Kristin Kupfer (eds.), *Die Energiepolitik Ostasiens* (East Asia's Energy Policy) (Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag, 2006); Michael T. Klare, "Fueling the Dragon: China's Strategic Energy Dilemma," *Current History*, April 2006, pp. 180–5; James Kyngé, *China Shakes the World* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2006), puts the energy question into the wider frame of resource supplies and environmental problems. Wesner/Braun show how much China's academics are aware of the conflict potential of China's energy strategy: Friederike Wesner/Anne J. Braun, "Chinas Energiediplomatie: Kooperation oder Konkurrenz in Asien?" (China's Energy Diplomacy: Cooperation or Competition in Asia?), in: *SWP-Zeitschriftenschau* 5 (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin: June 2006).
- 31 See David Shambaugh, "China Engages Asia," in *International Security*, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Winter 2004/2005); Zheng Bijian, *Peaceful Rise – China's New Road to Development* (Beijing: Central Party School Publishing House, 2005).
- 32 Cf. Roland Götz, *Europa und China im Wettstreit um Russlands Erdgas?* (Europe and China Competing for Russia's Natural Gas?) (Berlin: SWP-Aktuell, 2006); also Janis Vougioukas, "Notfalls mit Soldaten. China nimmt seine Interessen in Zentralasien wahr." (With Troops, if Necessary: China Takes Care of its Interests in Central Asia) in *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, München, 16 June 2006, p. 21. Basically, however, Bates Gill is, of course, correct when he observes in his chapter in this volume, "to the degree European policymakers see 'threats' emanating from China, they tend to be on either questions of 'soft security,' such as economic competition, illegal immigration, transnational crime, smuggling of drugs and contraband, environmental issues, and human rights, or on 'hard security' issues which have only an indirect impact on European security, such as Chinese proliferation. Indeed, it is clear the EU and individual European capitals see greater threats emanating from within China as a result of the country's remarkable but often messy social, economic and political transformation. Hence the strong European concern to assist Beijing smoothly and sustainably transition toward a more open and marketized socioeconomic system while avoiding destabilizing unrest and other

- domestic challenges" – even if that is easily explained for one thing by the fact that the EU and China, unlike the US and China, do not share a common border.
- 33 The peace-orientation of China's foreign policy has been expounded various times by party General Secretary and President Hu Jintao himself; cf. his speech to the UN on 15 September 2005, "Build Toward a Harmonious World of Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity" reprinted in *Beijing Review*, No. 42, October 2005).
- 34 Li Rongxia, "Significance of Zheng He's Voyages" in *Beijing Review*, Vol. 48, No. 28 (July 2005).
- 35 See Daniel Fried as quoted by Bates Gill in his chapter in this volume.
- 36 See Bao Hong, loc. cit.; Volker Stanzel, "Aufstieg zur Weltmacht" (Becoming a World Power), in Volker Ullrich/Eva Berié (eds.), *Weltmacht China* (China a World Power) (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2005); Baudin, op. cit.
- 37 This thesis certainly needs to be discussed at greater length. For the purpose of this paper it may suffice to indicate the successes of greater multilateral approaches such as in Afghanistan over other, less successful efforts. For several thorough analyses of the question of multilateralism in Asia and on the part of China. See, for example, Knut Dethlefsen and Bernt Berger (eds.), *Regional Security Architecture and Multilateralism* (Shanghai: Shanghai Institute for International Studies/Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Shanghai, 2004).
- 38 It may be this choice expressed by Zhang Zhijun, the deputy head of the International Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party, when on 5 February 2006 at the Munich Conference on Security Policy he said that China's policy is based on the principles of international law, that China hopes to settle traditional and non-traditional security issues through international cooperation and to jointly deal with global threats and challenges; also see Ding Gan, "Women zheyang yingxiang shijie" (This is How We Influence the World), in *Guoji shibao*, Beijing, 31 July 2006.
- 39 Intriguingly, in a survey undertaken in 2005 among 10,250 people in nine countries of the world, at least Germany and Chinese proved to be two peoples most convinced that a new world order will have to rely on the United Nations, cf. [http://today.reuters.com/news/newsArticle.aspx?type=topNews&storyID=2006-06-02T074257Z\\_01\\_L02336855\\_RTRUKOC\\_=\\_USA-CHINA-SURVEY.xml&pageNumber=1&imageid=&cap=&sz=13&WTModLoc=NewsArt-C1-Article](http://today.reuters.com/news/newsArticle.aspx?type=topNews&storyID=2006-06-02T074257Z_01_L02336855_RTRUKOC_=_USA-CHINA-SURVEY.xml&pageNumber=1&imageid=&cap=&sz=13&WTModLoc=NewsArt-C1-Article) Page 1. Cf. also Heribert Dieter, *Abschied vom Multilateralismus?* (Farewell to Multilateralism?) (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2003).
- 40 See Zhou Hong, "Wulun Fazhan Zhong-Ou Hezhuo Huoban Guanxi de Zhanlue Yiyi" (Discussion About the Strategic Implications of Developing the China-Europe Partnership), in *Zhongguo Zhanlue Guancha* Vol. 2 (2006), pp. 7-13; Mark Leonard and Andrew Small, *EU-China: Towards a Global Partnership*, published by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and The Foreign Policy Center (May 2005); Also of interest: John Humphrey/Dirk Messner, "China and India as Emerging Global Governance Actors: Challenges for Developing and Developed Countries," in: *IDS Bulletin Vol. 37 No. 1* (Institute of Development Studies, Bonn: January 2006), pp. 107-13.
- 41 The Taiwan issue and the question how the EU perceives it have been kept outside the framework of this discussion. But see, for example, Adam Ward, "The Taiwan Issue and the Role of the European Union," Remarks to Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik/CSIS Conference, April 2005; Heberer loc. cit., 50-2; Gunter Schubert, "Becoming Engaged? The European Union and Cross-Strait Relations," in: *ASIEN*, Vol. 89 (October 2003), pp. 5-25. Also see Jean Pierre Cabestan's discussion of Taiwan as an "irritant" in EU-China relations in this volume.
- 42 See Ruan Zongze's chapter in this volume, and Andreas Schockenhoff, "Deutsche Außenpolitik unter der Regierung Merkel" (German Foreign Policy under the Merkel Government), Lecture at the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Beijing, 19 April 2006. It might seem tempting to try to draw up a list of "values" and then compare how far they are shared values at the present time. However, "values," as the history of philosophy, religion, or of the discussions at e.g. the former Human Rights Commission of the United Nations in Geneva has amply demonstrated, lend themselves to varying interpretations which makes agreement on the principle easier but leaves the disagreement in the substance unresolved. Would not even the fiercest adversaries agree on the fundamental "value" of "peace"? It is precisely the point of the argument in this part of this chapter that larger efforts are necessary to bridge the distance which still exists between Europe and China in the most fundamental cultural questions of which "values" are but one part.
- 43 As a very good example, see the arguments put forward by Wang Jian, Li Xiaoning, Qiao Liang, Wang Xiangsui, *Xin Zhanguo Shidai* (The New Warring States Era) (Beijing: Xinhua Chubanshe, 2003).
- 44 Sometimes, that may even be true the other way round as well.
- 45 Tony Blair, loc. cit., argues that globalization creates interdependence which enforces common values if common systems of managing global problems are to function.
- 46 If David Shambaugh diagnoses "cognitive dissonance" between Europe and China, might we speak here of "cultural dissonance"?
- 47 See Seán Golden, "Socio-Cultural Aspects of the Relationship between the EU and East Asia, with Particular Reference to China," in Willem van der Geest, loc. cit.; also Brunhild Staiger, "Timeline of Chinese-European Cultural Relations," in *China Aktuell*, Vol. 6/04 (June 2004), pp. 648-63.
- 48 See Sebastian Bersick, loc. cit. More generally, see Barthold C. Witte, "Die Mühen der Ebene" (The Pains of the Plains) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 8 June 2006.
- 49 As well as in their relationship with the United States; see also Bates Gill's chapter in this volume.